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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
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This case requires us to interpret a Virgin Islands statute 
permitting the government to appeal, during a criminal 
trial, a ruling "involving a substantial and recurring 
question of law which requires appellate resolution." 4 
V.I.C. § 39(d) (Supp. 1996-1997). During the trial of 
defendants Zacchaeas Blake and Leon Nisbett, who were 
charged with third degree assault and possession of a 
firearm during a crime of violence, the Territorial Court of 
the Virgin Islands excluded certain of the government's 
evidence. In order to challenge these evidentiary rulings, 
the government moved for, and the trial court granted, 
leave for an immediate appeal under 4 V.I.C. § 39(d). The 
District Court of the Virgin Islands, however, dismissed the 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that the issues 
presented on appeal did not come within the ambit of the 
statute. This appeal presents us with the question whether 
the trial court's rulings involve a "substantial and recurring 
question of law which requires appellate resolution" within 
the meaning of 4 V.I.C. § 39(d). Because we conclude that 
they do not, we affirm the district court's order and remand 
the case to the district court for remand to the territorial 
court. 
 
I. FACTS 
 
According to the government, early in the morning of 
April 29, 1994, Wilson David and his four-year old son were 
driving home from David's sister's house. As they got out of 
their truck, four shots were fired at them. Neither was 
injured. David identified the man who fired the shots as 
Zacchaeas Blake and the man who accompanied him as 
Leon Nisbett, both of whom he knew previously. David's 
niece, who came out of David's apartment after hearing the 
gunfire, identified Blake as holding a gun and Nesbitt as 
sitting inside a maroon Honda. Blake allegedly asked David, 
before shooting, why David was "looking" at him. Nisbett 
and Blake were arrested and charged with four counts each 
of third degree assault under 14 V.I.C. §§ 297(2) and (3) 
(1996), and one count each of possession of a firearm 
during the commission of a crime of violence in violation of 
14 V.I.C. § 2253(a) (1996). 
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On the morning of trial, the court asked to hear pretrial 
motions. The defense moved to exclude some photographs, 
apparently of the crime scene, that the government had 
produced for the first time that morning. After some 
discussion about the motion, but before ruling, the 
territorial court decided first to select a jury and then to 
consider the pretrial motions. 
 
The judge selected the jury, had it sworn in, and then 
recessed for lunch. During the recess the court considered 
the motions. It first excluded the photographs on the 
grounds that they were not provided to the defendants 
before the morning of trial. Defendants also moved to 
exclude testimony by David, the complaining witness, that 
Blake "used to hang out with a guy that shot me[David] 
once." After inquiring whether the statement in question 
went to a possible motive by Blake for the alleged shooting, 
the court excluded the evidence because "the prejudice that 
it will form in the minds of this jury will outweigh the 
probative value." Nisbett then moved to exclude the 
introduction of certain physical evidence on the ground that 
it was not relevant. Blake moved to exclude the same 
evidence because the government had not produced it 
during discovery. The evidence -- a 9 millimeter live round, 
knife casings, a projectile, knives, and one billy club -- was 
found in the maroon Honda, which was registered in 
Joshua Blake's name, but the government had not charged 
that the evidence was used in the commission of the 
present offense. The court accordingly concluded that this 
evidence was "going to unduly prejudice this jury," and 
excluded it as to Nisbett. The court granted Blake's motion 
as well. Finally, the court excluded expert testimony by 
Officer Hitesman because the defense had requested the 
results of any scientific tests, and the government had 
identified none. 
 
The government sought an immediate appeal under 4 
V.I.C. § 39(d), which provides for appeals by the government 
during criminal trials if the government certifies that the 
appeal involves "a substantial and recurring question of law 
which requires appellate resolution." The court granted the 
motion and then declared a mistrial. It noted that the 
statute calls for adjournment of the trial but reasoned that 
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an appeal would last too long to keep the same jury. 
Counsel for Blake's attorney stated that he had no 
objection to declaring a mistrial. After the trial, the 
government submitted written certification, and on 
November 18, 1994, the court entered a written order that 
"the Government's Motion for Leave to Appeal from 
Interlocutory Rulings Suppressing Evidence is hereby 
GRANTED." 
 
The district court dismissed the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. It reasoned that the case did not involve 
substantial and recurring questions of law and that the 
appeal was accordingly not permitted under 4 V.I.C. § 39. 
The court also noted that it "seriously questions whether a 
statute allowing the Government such an appeal during a 
criminal trial after jeopardy attached can withstand 
constitutional analysis." For these two reasons, and 
because of the "general bias" against interlocutory appeals 
in criminal cases, the district court concluded that the 
territorial court erred in giving leave to appeal under 4 
V.I.C. § 39, and it dismissed the case. This appeal followed. 
 
II. JURISDICTION 
 
Before exploring the specific jurisdictional question that 
this case presents, we outline the general jurisdictional 
framework for appeals from decisions of the district courts 
of the Virgin Islands. 
 
Federal law provides that this Court has jurisdiction over 
"appeals from all final decisions of the district court on 
appeal from the courts established by local law." 48 U.S.C. 
§ 1613a(c); see 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In this case, the decision 
of the district court was on appeal from a court established 
by local law; if that decision was "final," this Court has 
jurisdiction. In In re Alison, 837 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1988), we 
considered a decision of the district court which reversed a 
territorial court's ruling that the plaintiff had failed to state 
a cause of action. The district court's order was not "final," 
because that order merely concluded that the plaintiff had 
stated a cause of action and remanded the case for further 
proceedings. See generally, Caitlin v. United States, 324 
U.S. 229, 233 (1945); Quackenbush v. Allstate, 116 S.Ct. 
1712, 1718-1719 (1996). 
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In this case, however, we are called upon only to decide 
the scope of the district court's own jurisdiction. The 
district court did not reach the merits of the dispute, and 
neither do we. Under these circumstances review is 
appropriate under the collateral order doctrine. See In re. 
Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 959 (3d Cir. 1997). The 
Virgin Island's legislature explicitly permits appeals during 
criminal trials, thus the efficiency interests that animate 
the final judgment rule are not at work here. Id. at 
959-961. Moreover, this issue is separable from the merits, 
was conclusively decided by the district court, is 
unreviewable on appeal, and involves an unresolved 
question of law -- the scope of § 39(d). The problems that 
generally accompany application of the collateral order 
doctrine in criminal cases, see, e.g. , United States v. 
McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325, 330 (10th Cir. 1997), are not at 
work here because we are applying a statute that itself calls 
for interlocutory appeals. See also, In re A.M., 34 F.3d 153, 
156 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying the collateral order doctrine in 
a criminal case in which the district court decision affirmed 
a territorial court's order that a minor be transferred for 
prosecution as an adult). 
 
The district court's jurisdiction over the appeal from the 
territorial court is derived from a federal law providing that 
the district courts of the Virgin Islands shall have "such 
appellate jurisdiction over the courts of the Virgin Islands 
as established by local law to the extent now or hereafter 
prescribed by local law." 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(a). Turning to 
the local law, the Virgin Islands Code, in a section entitled 
"Appellate jurisdiction," states that the "district court has 
appellate jurisdiction to review the judgments and orders of 
the territorial court. . .in all criminal cases in which the 
defendant has been convicted, other than on a plea of 
guilty." 4 V.I.C. § 33 (Supp. 1996-1997). 
 
Section 33 would preclude an appeal to the district court 
in this case, because the defendant has not been convicted. 
The territorial court relied, however, on section 39 of the 
Virgin Islands Code, entitled "Appeals by the United States 
and the Government of the Virgin Islands." 4 V.I.C. § 39. 
Section 39 provides for appeals in situations where the 
defendant has not been convicted, but does not explicitly 
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mention to which court the appeal may be taken. We 
nonetheless conclude that, where applicable, § 39 does 
grant appellate jurisdiction to the district courts of the 
Virgin Islands. To conclude otherwise would seriously 
circumscribe the availability of an appeal under this section.1 
Moreover, before the enactment of § 39, § 33 included the 
sentence "appeals in criminal cases may be taken only by 
the defendant." This sentence was eliminated when§ 39 
was added to the Code. Act No. 3321, 1972 V.I. Sess. Laws 
464, 464 (October 25, 1972). It was thus the obvious intent 
of the legislature to ensure that the district courts did have 
jurisdiction over appeals by the government if so permitted 
under § 39. 
 
III. A SUBSTANTIAL AND RECURRING QUESTION OF 
LAW 
 
We now turn to the issue in this case -- whether this 
appeal to the district court was permissible pursuant to 
§ 39. The section reads: 
 
§ 39. Appeals by the United States and the 
Government of the Virgin Islands 
 
(a)(1) The United States or the Government of the 
Virgin Islands may appeal an order, entered before the 
trial of a person charged with a criminal offense under 
the laws of the Virgin Islands, which directs the return 
of seized property, suppresses evidence, or otherwise 
denies the prosecutor the use of evidence at trial, if the 
United States Attorney or the Attorney General 
conducting the prosecution for such violation certifies 
to the Judge who granted such motion that the appeal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Under such a reading of § 39, appeals would be permitted in cases 
that were tried in the district court, but appeals would not be permitted 
to the district court from trials in the territorial court. See, Government 
of the Virgin Islands v. Testamark, 570 F.2d 482, 483 n.2 (3d Cir. 1978) 
(permitting an appeal from a trial in the district court under 4 V.I.C. 
§ 39(c)), but see Government of the Virgin Islands v. David, 741 F.2d 653, 
654 n.2 (3d Cir. 1984) (expressing doubt as to whether this provision of 
the Virgin Islands Code applies to appeals from trials in the district 
court). If the dicta in David is correct,§ 39 would have no force 
whatsoever if it did not apply to trials in the territorial court. 
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is not taken for the purpose of delay and the evidence 
is a substantial proof of the charge pending against the 
defendant. 
 
(2) A motion for the return of seized property or to 
suppress evidence shall be made before trial unless 
opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was 
not aware of the grounds for the motion. 
 
(b) The United States or the Government of the Vir gin 
Islands may appeal a ruling made during the trial of a 
person charged with a criminal offense under the laws 
of the Virgin Islands which suppresses or otherwise 
denies the prosecutor the use of evidence on the 
ground that it was invalidly obtained, if the United 
States Attorney or the Attorney General conducting the 
prosecution for such violation certifies to the Judge 
who made the ruling that the appeal is not taken for 
the purpose of delay and that the evidence is a 
substantial proof of the charge being tried against the 
defendant. The trial court shall adjourn the trial until 
the appeal shall be resolved. 
 
(c) The United States or the Government of the Vir gin 
Islands may appeal an order dismissing an information 
or otherwise terminating a prosecution in favor of a 
defendant or defendants as to one or more counts 
thereof, except where there is an acquittal on the 
merits. 
 
(d) The United States or the Government of the  Virgin 
Islands may appeal any other ruling made during the 
trial of a person charged with an offense under the laws 
of the Virgin Islands which the United States Attorney or 
the Attorney General certifies as involving a substantial 
and recurring question of law which requires appellate 
resolution. Such an appeal may be taken only during 
trial and only with the leave of the court. The trial court 
shall adjourn the trial until the appeal shall be 
resolved. 
 
(e) Any appeal taken pursuant to this section eith er 
before or during trial shall be expedited. If an appeal is 
taken pursuant to subsections (b) or (d) during  the 
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trial, the appellate court shall, to the extent practicable, 
give the appeal priority over all other pending appeals. 
 
(f) Pending the prosecution and determination of a n 
appeal taken pursuant to this section, the defendant 
shall be detained or released in accordance with 
applicable law. 
 
4 V.I.C. § 39 (emphasis added). 
 
The territorial court gave the government leave to appeal 
under subsection (d), without considering on the record 
whether an appeal of its rulings would involve "a 
substantial and recurring question of law which requires 
appellate resolution." The Virgin Islands Attorney General 
certified that the evidentiary rulings did involve such a 
question. The district court disagreed and dismissed the 
case for lack of jurisdiction. We exercise plenary review over 
whether the territorial court's evidentiary rulings presented 
a "substantial and recurring question of law" because this 
is an issue of statutory interpretation, Christian v. Joseph, 
15 F.3d 296, 297 (3d Cir. 1994), and because it involves 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Government of the 
Virgin Islands v. Warner, 48 F.3d 688, 691 (3d Cir. 1995).2 
 
In interpreting § 39(d), familiar canons of statutory 
interpretation direct that we begin with the text of the 
statute. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Sharp, 87 F.3d 89, 92 
(3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). We are mindful that in 
considering subsection (d), we must look to the entirety of 
§ 39 because the text of the statute "is to be read as a 
whole. . . .since the meaning of statutory language, plain, or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Although the statute is not clear, we believe that § 39(d) requires that 
the court review the certification that there exists a "substantial and 
recurring question of law requiring appellate resolution." If the issue did 
present a "substantial and recurring question of law requiring appellate 
resolution," the territorial court's decision to grant leave to appeal would 
be reviewed by us only for an abuse of discretion. We would apply this 
standard of review because the statute vests the trial court with the 
discretion to grant or deny leave to appeal, presumably based on its 
familiarity with the course of the litigation. See United States v. Criden, 
648 F.2d 814, 817-818 (3d Cir. 1981) (where trial court has a "superior 
vantage point" from which to resolve the question, its decision "merits a 
high degree of insulation for appellate revision"). 
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not, depends on context." Hudson United Bank v. Chase 
Manhattan Bank of Conn., 43 F.3d 843, 848 n.11 (3d Cir. 
1994 ) (quoting King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 
221 (1991) (further citation omitted)). This is consistent 
with Virgin Islands law which provides that in interpreting 
its statutes "words and phrases" must be read "with their 
context" and "construed according to the common and 
approved usage of the English language." 4 V.I.C. § 42 
(1921). Terms that are "technical" or that have "acquired a 
peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law," are to be 
"construed and understood according to their peculiar and 
appropriate meaning." Id. 
 
None of the terms in the phrase "substantial and 
recurring question of law which requires appellate 
resolution" are defined by the statute. The term "question of 
law" does, however, at least in one sense, have a particular 
meaning in the law, where questions of law are 
distinguished from questions of fact. We thus understand a 
"question of law" as something other than a question of 
fact. Virgin Islands statutes on the books before the 
enactment of § 39 confirm this reading. Title 30, section 35, 
of the Virgin Islands Code, governing public utilities, for 
example, distinguishes between "questions of law" and 
"findings of fact" in appeals from the findings of the 
Commission. 30 V.I.C. § 35. Although this helps frame our 
inquiry, it by no means ends it. As many courts have 
remarked, distinguishing questions of fact from those of law 
is often no simple task. Thompson v. Keohane, 116 S.Ct. 
457, 464 n.10 (1995) (collecting cases). 
 
The rulings at issue in this case were made under Fed. 
R. Evid. 403 and Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 16. There is no question 
that these rules applied to this case, that the court used 
the correct standard in applying the rules,3 and that the 
district court ordered relief specifically contemplated by 
both rules -- exclusion of the evidence. Under these 
circumstances, trial court orders made pursuant to these 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The government has suggested that the territorial court acted with an 
improper motive when it excluded the evidence. For the reasons set forth 
infra note 5, we reject this characterization of the issues presented by 
this appeal. 
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two rules lie entirely within the court's discretion and are 
only reviewed for an abuse of that discretion. Abrams v. 
Lightolier, Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1213 (3d Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1111 (3d Cir. 1985); see 
also, 25 Moore's Federal Practice, § 616.02[4][e] (Matthew 
Bender 3d ed. 1997). Indeed, "if judicial restraint is ever 
desirable it is when a Rule 403 analysis of a trial court is 
reviewed by an appellate tribunal." United States v. Balter, 
91 F.3d 427, 442 (3d Cir.) (quoting United States v. Scarfo, 
850 F.2d 1015, 1019 (3d Cir. 1988)), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 
517 (1996). This is so in large part because the trial court 
sits in a unique position to evaluate the evidentiary and 
discovery questions, including the selection of sanctions, 
which suggests that the application of these rules in a 
particular case is unlikely to involve "substantial" or 
"recurring" "questions of law." 
 
The issues presented here confirms this conclusion. 
Application of Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 involved determining 
what discovery the district court had ordered; whether, 
when, and to what extent the government had complied 
with such orders; the importance of compliance to the case; 
and the appropriateness of various sanctions. Similarly, the 
orders made under Fed. R. Civ. P. 403 required the court 
to determine the purpose of the evidence, its value to the 
government, and its potential prejudice to the defendant in 
the context of the other evidence that the parties would 
introduce. Because these inquiries hinged almost entirely 
on the facts of this particular case, we conclude that the 
trial court's rulings presented no "substantial" question of 
law. For the same reason, any questions of law that the 
rulings raise are not "recurring"-- this case has unfolded in 
a unique way, and the evidentiary and discovery rulings 
from which appeal is sought present questions that are 
specific to this case. 
 
In its post-argument brief, the government characterizes 
the question for review as "where the defendant has not 
been prejudiced, does a trial court have the power under 
Rule 16(d)(2)4 to, in effect, dismiss a serious criminal 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. It is unclear whether the government, by asserting that this is the 
question on appeal, was abandoning its argument that the Rule 403 
rulings were appealable under the statute. Because the government 
made no explicit concession and because their earlier briefs argue that 
the Rule 403 rulings were appealable, we nonetheless considered this 
question. 
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charge as a sanction for discovery violations?"5 But 
defendants have not conceded, and the trial court did not 
find, that the "defendants have not been prejudiced" and 
that excluding the evidence in this case was "in effect, 
dismiss[ing]" the charges against the defendants. Indeed, 
the trial court was clearly concerned with prejudice when it 
stated, with reference to the physical evidence that "what if 
after seeing this billy club he wanted to hire an expert 
witness? He wouldn't be able to because at the last minute 
you are springing on him at least six items." As to the 
assertion that the exclusion of the evidence was equivalent 
to "dismissing" the case, both the victim and his niece 
identified the defendants, who were known to them 
previously. Indeed, Blake's attorney stated at trial that this 
is what he thought the whole case was about -- the 
testimony of the government's witnesses versus that of the 
defendants. Because the victim, who witnessed the crime, 
and his niece, who saw the scene immediately after shots 
were fired, were both prepared to identify the defendants as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The government formulated the question differently in its first brief to 
this court: "to what extent may a trial court penalize the Government for 
the carelessness or confusion of an individual prosecutor?" At oral 
argument two other versions of the this question were offered by the 
government: "the propriety of the sanction in this case," and "whether or 
not, simply because the trial court is annoyed with counsel, whether she 
can effectively gut the government's entire case?" These questions 
incorrectly characterize the issue presented by this appeal. The trial 
court excluded evidence under Rule 403 because it was not sufficiently 
probative in light of the unfair prejudice it could cause. Evidence was 
excluded under Rule 16 because the government failed to comply with 
the court's discovery orders. Although the discovery sanctions may 
penalize the government for the "carelessness and confusion" of one 
prosecutor who failed to follow discovery rules, this is entirely 
appropriate under Rule 16. Moreover, we do not read the transcript to 
suggest that the judge ruled as she did because she was "annoyed," 
instead the record shows that she ruled after considering the appropriate 
factors under the rules in question. Finally, the government never stated 
to the trial court that this was the issue for which it sought review; we 
thus have no reason to think that this was the issue which the trial 
court gave the government leave to appeal. Appeals under § 39(d) require 
leave from the trial court. 
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the perpetrators, the characterization of the exclusion of 
the evidence as a "dismissal" is entirely without merit.6 
 
The balance of the statute also supports our conclusion 
that the Virgin Islands legislature did not intend to permit 
this appeal when it enacted the statute. Subsections (b) 
and (d) of § 39 provide the circumstances under which the 
government may appeal a ruling made during trial. Under 
(b) the government may appeal rulings made during trial 
that exclude government evidence "on the ground that it 
was invalidly obtained." 4 V.I.C. § 39(b). The government 
must certify, however, that "the evidence is a substantial 
proof of the charge being tried against the defendant." Id. 
 
Subsection (d) works the same way. It begins, however, 
with a broader set of rulings. Under it the government may 
appeal "any other ruling made during trial." This is limited, 
however, by the language that requires government 
certification that the ruling involve "a substantial and 
recurring question of law that requires appellate 
resolution." 4 V.I.C. § 39(d). Thus while subsection (b) is 
concerned with the importance of the evidence to the trial 
at hand, different concerns animate subsection (d). It is 
focused not on the role that the evidence plays in the 
specific trial but instead with the importance of the legal 
question that the trial court's ruling presents. This intent is 
made clear with the terms "substantial" and "recurring" 
which modify the phrase "question of law." Thus it is not 
enough, under subsection (d) that the ruling excluded 
evidence that was important to the government's case-- 
the ruling must also present a question of law that has 
import in other cases as well. There is no issue on appeal 
which meets this standard. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the order of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. For this reason we also reject the government's argument that an 
appeal lies under 48 U.S.C. § 1493(a). Nor was an appeal available under 
subsection (b) because the order of trial court was made "after the 
defendant had been put in jeopardy." 48 U.S.C.§ 1493(b). See also, 18 
U.S.C. § 3731. 
 
                                13 
 the district court, dismissing the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction, and remand this case to the district court for 
remand to the territorial court.7 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
7. Because the issue of double jeopardy was not fully briefed to us, we 
will not in this appeal decide whether double jeopardy bars retrial of the 
defendants.                                 
 
                                14 
